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Both the UK and EU have consistently acknowledged that a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) may not be 
achieved and – as the clock runs down on the transition period – a proliferating view is that the 
possibility of an EU-UK trading relationship based on WTO terms seems at least very likely, if not 
reality. 
The prospect of a WTO Brexit, for which the increasing likelihood was recently[1] warned of by UK 
Chief Brexit negotiator David Frost, constitutes the UK falling into ‘third country’ status where, if no 
UK-EU FTA is realised, it will be subject to WTO tariffs when importing into the EU, among other 
WTO trading rules (or, ‘trade schedules’). 
Though some (purported) optimism of ratification of an FTA has since arisen,[2] and has again 
fluctuated,[3] the time sensitive nature of current negotiations has culminated in an increased 
willingness to question the UK’s preparedness for, and nature of, implications that arise from a 
‘WTO’ Brexit. 
A WTO, or ‘no-deal’, Brexit involves trade on what are colloquially recognised as ‘minimal’ trading 
terms – in contradistinction to the UK’s previous relationship with the EU where it benefitted from 
the preferential status, and zero-tariffs, under the EU trading system – which constitute a very much 
‘ bare bones’ type of regulation on trade. 
When considered against the UK’s previous relationship with the EU, this approach garners 
significant complexity[4] and has been denounced widely on grounds best surmised as constituting 
an ‘unsatisfactory solution.. politically, economically and socially’.[5] 
However, I feel that should one consider how a WTO Brexit will shape the UK’s post-Brexit 
relationship with the EU, an outstanding question must be answered: to what extent is the UK’s 
previous relationship with the EU can be retained, or advantage gained – through incremental 
agreements – such as ‘equivalence’ arrangements (for example, notably, financial services)? 
To achieve this, one must understand that the nature of EU-UK relations, particularly on trade, do 
not, at least in theory, hinge solely upon whether an FTA is struck. Rather, the relationship is better 
perceived as being closer, or further away, depending on the amount of ancillary agreements that 
are set up between the UK-EU outside an FTA. 
This is often unappreciated, as much in the way of Brexit matters are caught up political malaise 
which is particularly true on matters which concern upon sovereignty. However, if setting ideological 
rationale for WTO Brexit aside, a perhaps optimal (or, obvious) lens through which to consider a 
WTO Brexit is by examining its economic and legal implications for the UK. 
In respect of its prospective relationship with the EU, a WTO Brexit would, theoretically, mean that 
the UK would loses access to the Single market and by extension markets which the EU gains access 
to by being party to FTA’s. However, this is not necessarily true and the gap between UK and EU can 
be bridged by ancillary agreements for which financial services is a prominent example. 
The UK is a global leader on financial services which was amplified by its relationship with the EU. 
Problematically, EU Financial services law is noted for licensing requirements and further its 
stringent approach to ‘passporting’, which enables financial institutions to carry out services 
throughout the EU without having to set up individually. 
The importance of post-Brexit relations on financial services are amplified by the EU’s extensive 
access across a number of markets through its recently agreed FTA’s which could be beneficial to the 
UK. These extend beyond that of the WTO as regards market access rights and non-discriminatory 
treatment, a few examples of which are: 
“• Commitments in the EU-Canada FTA that ensure that EU financial services businesses are 
permitted to transfer certain forms of data out of the country for processing; 
“• Commitments in the EU-Singapore and EU-Canada FTA to allow the provision of certain portfolio 
management services cross border between related entities providing collective investment 
schemes in the EU and Singapore and Canada; 
“• Commitments by Canada in the EU-Canada FTA to remove some restrictions on non-Canadian 
nationals serving on boards of Canadian financial institutions.”[6] 
However, if the UK does not strike an FTA with this EU does not mean that it cannot have access to 
EU markets for financial services, but rather, these are what constitute the prospective ‘equivalence’ 
arrangements which are under negotiation. Equivalence concerns whether another state’s legal 
requirements for regulating a product are of standard despite not being necessarily the same and 
because the UK has previously been under EU law and it is a global leader in financial services, it is 
likely that reasonable EU-UK equivalence on financial services can be realised.[7] 
Exactly how these arrangements will play out (and, importantly, just how much market access the 
UK can obtain) is unknown as of yet, however this can be done without an FTA. 
EU-UK trade will not die if an FTA is not struck. Contrarily, there are other means by which the (albeit 
voluminous) barrier to trade that Brexit is, can be mitigated for which financial services is a relevant 
example, particularly for the UK as it is a global leader. As the old saying goes: there is more than 
one way to skin a cat. 
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